"X" Makes the Vote
You won't find anything at this site about finding just the right technical way that America should vote. "X makes the vote" begins with the principle that in counting the votes, a system that everybody can understand is to be used. This is to be better than a system that, at best, one in a million can understand.

The new machine systems will be discussed insofar as they demonstrate that the problem is not that America CAN'T vote, but that our vote is being stolen.

The most salient showing that Diebold can't run an election was the statement by its chairman, O'Dell, of the necessity of electing Bush in 2004. That statement, alone, should have precluded Diebold from any connection to elections. The followup, which was next to haphazard, was the clincher, as they would have to convince where convincing was, otherwise, impossible.

This was public relations. But improving the machines isn't any answer. Again, we need the system in which everybody can understand how votes are counted, as opposed to where only the very few know or would claim to know. We need the system where the people who count the votes come from the body of people that makes their votes.

Marking the ballot with an "X" isn't foolproof, but it doesn't give the vote, the franchise, away. Electronic voting is automatically a potential fraud, or a hoax, in which the people who run the counting can decide or not whether a result can be skewed.

Dr. Stephen Freedman in a University of Pennsylvania study of the 2004 election studied presidential results in swing counties in all the 50 states and D.C., comparing the results with exit polls in those counties. The result must be said to demonstrate that no time was wasted in this election in the ability to skew results and actually doing it. In 42 states, election results reported by election boards veered toward Bush, compared to the exit polls, and by as much as 10%. In 8 states and D.C. the election board results veered toward Kerry, but only by up to 5%. A correspondence to use of voting machines was shown in these figures.

Dr. Freedman took the results in three major states ( OH, PA, and FL), all veering to Bush from the exit polls, and figured the odds against this occurring by chance at 250,000,000 to 1. Later, he changed those odds to 660,000 to 1 from methodological possibilities.

That figure of 660,000 to 1, though several orders of magnitude less, emphasizes how stupendous the certainty of skewing was, because the much smaller number of the odds was still so very impossible to overcome.

The odds, of course, would increase when applied to all the states and D.C.

How fast should we be willing to throw out electronic voting, then,if the decision were to be based on other than theoretical grounds, that is, upon what just occurred in the 2004 election?

There is general understanding that the standard in a criminal case is 'beyond a reasonable doubt', and that the standard in most civil cases is 'the preponderance of the evidence'. When it comes to voting the standard should even be less. If a study could substantiate electronic voting at 75% chance that the votes weren't skewed, and 25% that they were, the electronic system should be discarded. As it is, the electronic system should be thrown out without so much as a second thought.

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